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Letters to Editor
A method to automate probabilistic sensitivity analyses of misclassified binary variables From ROGER MARSHALL Fox et al. 1 examine the relationship between odds ratios for a binary measured exposure variable X and the underlying true exposure E. One form of the relationship 2,3 that the authors do not consider is:
where Q 0 , Q 1 (Q 0 0 , Q 0 1 ) are quality indices of misclassification in cases (controls). Here Q 1 is sensitivity (SE) re-scaled according the measured prevalence of exposure P X i.e. Q 1 5 (SE À P X )/(1 À P X ) and Q 0 is specificity (SP) re-scaled according the measured prevalence of non-exposure P X X i.e. Q 0 ¼ SPÀP X X ð Þ = 1ÀP X X ð Þ. The Q indices are sometimes known as chance corrected sensitivity and specificity. Consider, for example, using the lung cancer data in Fox et al. The measured prevalence of exposure in cases is 45/139 5 0.32 and in controls it is 257/1202 5 0.21. When specificity and sensitivity are non-differential and both equal 0.9, which is one situation considered by Fox, the Q indices are Q 1 5 0.85, Q Tables 2 and 3) .
Consider though, when specificity and sensitivity are non-differential and both equal 0.8. Then Q 1 5 0.71, Q Table 2 and 3 in Fox. Here Q 0 0 ¼ 0:06 is hopelessly low, because the probability of observing nonexposure in controls truly not exposed, (specificity 0.8), is not substantially different from the measured probability of non-exposure 0.79.
Fox et al.'s approach is to ask how much bias there is for given values of sensitivity and specificity. An alternative view is to ask: for what values of sensitivity and specificity is there little or no bias? From (1), and by definition of the Q indices, if any two of the four sensitivity and specificity parameters are fixed, the relationship between the remaining two is linear. Turning to the lung cancer data again, fix the sensitivity and specificity in controls at 0.9. Corresponding values of sensitivity and specificity in cases which yield no bias fall along the straight line in the Figure 1 . Above the line B , 1, below it B . 1. The shaded areas either side of the line show where the bias is 610% i.e. 0.91 , B , 1.1 and where it is 650% i.e. 0.66 , B , 1.5. Only for a narrow range of case specificity and sensitivity will bias not be too serious (,10%). Superimposed on the Figure are values of bias at selected points.
It is worth noting that the V-shaped boundaries converge at the point (1À0.32, 0.32), 0.32 being the prevalence of exposure in cases. With these values of case sensitivity and specificity, Q 0 and Q 1 are both zero and correction for bias cannot be done, at least, using this approach.
In 3 I investigated the magnitude of sensitivities, specificities, quality indices and bias in a meta-analysis of many studies in which exposure measurements had been validated against an ostensibly 'true' measure. Unlike sensitivity and specificity, Q indices are often roughly non-differential. There was no systematic bias in either direction and the magnitude of the empirical bias did not, in most cases, reach statistical significance. This does not mean that misclassification bias should Figure 1 Bias boundaries for control sensitivity and specificify fixed at 0.9 While appreciating Dr Marshall's comments 1 on our manuscript, we are concerned that his approach understates the potential distortions engendered by misclassification. In particular, while we see no flaw in Dr Marshall's algebra, we disagree strongly with his conclusion that adopting scenario situations based on specified sensitivity and specificity values can be misleading and pessimistic; specificity and sensitivity are not absolutes, they are restricted in their range of possible values, depending on the measured exposure prevalence. The key to considering whether bias is present is not in terms of differentiality of specificity and sensitivity but in differentiality of their chance-corrected counterparts Sensitivity and specificity are indeed not absolutes, which is one reason we treated them as random variables. Nonetheless, Dr Marshall's model 1,3 and conclusion focus on algebraic rather than contextual (substantive) properties. We believe this focus is potentially misleading and leads to overly optimistic conclusions. In particular, we think he has overlooked optimistic biases in his own literature analyses.
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To say that a classification method is nondifferential with respect to disease means it has identical operating characteristics among cases and controls, so that sensitivity and specificity do not vary with disease status. We expect this property to hold when the mechanisms that determine the classification are identical among cases and controls. In particular, we expect nondifferentiality when the disease is unrelated to exposure measurement. This expectation is reasonable when the mechanisms that determine the classification precede the disease occurrence and are not affected by uncontrolled risk factors. Thus to say there is no recall bias (as when exposure data are collected from records that predate the outcome) means that neither disease nor uncontrolled risk factors prompt more false-positive responses from cases than from controls. Put more abstractly, nondifferentiality means that the classification X is independent of the outcome Y (i.e. Y conveys no information about X) conditional on the true exposure E and whatever has been controlled, not that some 'chance-corrected' measure is the same in cases and controls. This condition may be rarely met, but at least it can be criticized based on qualitative mechanistic considerations.
It is intuitions and judgments about the role of the outcome Y in exposure classification errors that are the basis for priors about measurement behaviour. These judgements provide one reason to express such priors in terms of sensitivity and specificity, despite the greater clumsiness of algebra and statistics when compared to expressions based on predictive values 5 or on 'chance-corrected' measures like Q 1 and Q 0 . Furthermore, statisticians have traditionally focused on sensitivity and specificity because, when combined with other assumptions (such as independence of errors across variables), their nondifferentiality can preserve validity of the test of the null, 6 although this result is often over-interpreted.
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With regard to Dr Marshall's empirical meta-study of bias, 4 we think he has over-generalized limited findings from a highly select group of 16 reports found in the original source. 8 First, we should expect that the very presence of a
